/b/ - Random

if you wanna prevent abortion stop having sex with women lmao

>>318585
I have never had sex with anyone

>>318587
clearly

>>318589
So my view is that I value sentience for all beings that have at one point reached sentience.

So the potential for sentience for all beings that have at one point reached sentience, this is why I do not think most cases of abortions are ethical, or should be legal. This is also why my view doesn't lead me into sperm rights reductios, egg rights reductios, or killing people while they're in comas. I do think there's a difference between…

I do think my ethical, at least ethically, I think there's a difference maybe, sorry, legally, there should be a difference between the case of rape and the case of non-rape. We could go into the symmetry breakers for that. There may or may not be a difference ethically.

Well, there probably is, but I still think it probably would be unethical. So what I think you would want is a symmetry breaker for the rape case and the non-rape case. Is that correct?

[S2]

Yeah, sure. And when you say potential for sentience, so if a fetus hasn't… Okay, so wait, for potential sentience, it would have to have already had sentience?

No, no.

[S1]

So I value… So here's what I value. I value the potential for sentience for all beings that have at one point reached sentience in the past.

[S2]

Okay, so that's why a coma victim… Okay, so if it's just a fetus that hasn't reached sentience yet, not a big deal. Okay.

[S1]

Correct.

[S2]

All right, cool.

[S1]

Yeah. Okay, cool. So the symmetry breakers that over-determine, so I'm not saying these are exactly the symmetry breakers, that if one is missing, then it wouldn't be a sufficient symmetry breaker to make a difference in the attitude towards the belief.

However, these over-determine it. In other words, if these symmetry breakers are in place, then it would be a difference such that you would say, okay, my view of how moral or legal this is should be different, really legal. So the symmetry breakers that over-determine the responsibility condition is what I call it, so obvious difference in the rape versus non-rape cases.

In the non-rape case, on my view, there's a responsibility condition to the fetus. Why is there a responsibility condition to the fetus? On my view is there's a conjunction of the following four things.

Number one, so it's a conjunction. It's not, it's a…

[S2]

Can I actually write this down? Yeah, sure. Yeah.

[S1]

Yeah, I can actually send it to you.

[S2]

Yeah, I guess you could. Are you going to send it to me just through Discord or…

[S1]

Oh, this is like a… I don't know why the text is…

[S2]

Yeah, it's all black and white.

[S1]

Yeah, I don't know why I did that. I did it on a four-page document.

[S2]

Are you on your phone or your laptop?

[S1]

I'm on a laptop. I'll just do it. Yeah, I'll just do it here.

There we go. Okay, I'll edit that to make it look pretty. Four things.

Number one, number two, three, four. Okay, so the symmetry breakers that over-determine the responsibility condition are the following four things. It's a conjunction of the four things.

It's not any one of them alone, but the over-determination is for the following four things. Number one, the individual partook in forcing another being to be in a state of dependence upon that individual in the first place. Number two, the being is sentient or currently sentient.

Number three, the dependency has already been instantiated, so it's not a question, for example, of you knocked someone over with a car and that you need their kidney, or they need to be hooked up to you. Do they have the right to hook themselves up to you? This is actually in a case where it's already taken place, where the hooking up is already there.

Does it matter if that's not there? I don't know. This is just there to over-determine it because that's just the case in the abortion case.

Number four, knowledge of the current probability of forcing another being to be dependent on you. So if all four of those things are there, it over-determines the symmetry breaker.

[S2]

Okay. Let's see. So I'll just do the Judith Jarvis Thompson violinist thing.

Okay, so let's just change that hypothetical where instead of waking up next to the person attached, let's say you know the person, you care about them, you willingly attached yourself to them, and then one day you decided…

[S1]

I have to stop you there. It's not that you willingly attach yourself to them, it's you partook in forcing them to be in a state of dependency on you. So for example, let's say there was a poison, right?

So let's say I inject you with a poison for fun, and there was a certain probability that that poison would cause you to be in a state of dependence on me that you would need to be hooked up to me for a given amount of time.

[S2]

Sure.

[S1]

Knowing this, I decide to have the fun anyway, and I start injecting you with the poison, and lo and behold, that's instantiated. I wake up, and it turns out, for whatever reason, I engaged in this activity where I injected you with this poison, and it turns out that you just happened to be dependent on me, and I knew the risk, and I took it, and I injected you, and I forced you to be in a state of dependency on me. Now the question is…

[S2]

Okay.

[S1]

Yeah, so the question is, now that I forced you to be in a state of dependency…

[S2]

Wait, wait, wait. Run through that again. So you poison someone just for fun, and because you poison them, they need your kidney, and then you attach them to you.

[S1]

Well, not kidney. It doesn't matter. Yeah, it doesn't have to be poison.

It doesn't have to be kidney. Whatever reason, you're attached for nine months. The key point here is that you were the ones that forced this individual to be dependent on you in the first place.

[S2]

Okay, so it's the forcing issue that you have a problem with.

[S1]

Yeah, yeah. That's one of the symmetry breakers, yeah.

[S2]

Okay. That's a tough one. All right, yeah.

[S1]

Abortion holocaust always is, Richard.

[S2]

Yeah. All right, let me think of that. Okay, and…

All right, I think the way I'm going to have to go here is… I guess bring up the rape example. So you said that in a legal context, succubi should be allowed to get an abortion due to rape.

What about in a moral context?

[S1]

So in a moral context isn't what we… Well, it's what we morally aren't allowed to do. So I don't have a fully fleshed out view on that.

My intuition is telling me that it probably would still be wrong. However, yeah, so I may not have a difference in view on that. It may not be enough to make a…

It may not be enough to overdetermine a symmetry breaker in a moral context. But I think my position is perfectly consistent in the legal context. Because, for example, if anyone were to say that, you know, I forced you to be in a position of dependency on me.

You know, let's say I just did it to you. I just, you know, decided to have fun and make you required to be hooked up to me. I wake up and you're hooked up to me.

I knew that it would happen if I… I knew that it was a given probability. If it happened to happen, I took the risk.

The dependency is already instantiated and you are currently sentient. And now the question is, should it be legal for me to chop you up? Well, given that I was the one that forced you to be in this damn position anyway, I have no consent of your own.

Probably not.

[S2]

Well, wait, that's a little different in a rape case. It would be somebody forcing you to have someone else be dependent on you.

[S1]

Yes. So you're not the one. The key is that in the rape case, you are not…

It is not the case that you partook in forcing another being to be a state of dependence on you. It's not through your voluntary actions that you force someone to be dependent on you. Whereas in the non-rape case, that is the case.

It is the case that you, through your voluntary actions, force someone else to be dependent on you. So, for example, let's say in the rape case, let's say someone took you and hooked you up to me, right? Let's say that I wake up and all of a sudden, I find out that someone else injected this poison into you, right?

So someone else injected a poison into you for fun. They knew that there may be a chance that you would be hooked up to me, that need to be hooked up to me. And they just did it anyway.

I was not the one that injected you for fun. This other individual was. And then lo and behold, I wake up and, hey, you're hooked up to me.

Do I have, am I legally forced to maintain being hooked up to you now? And I think in that case, there's a big difference. There's a huge difference between that and if I was the one that actually forced you to be in a state of dependence where you would need to be hooked up to me.

Huge difference. In that case, there's a much more, there's a much greater responsibility I have to you. Clear symmetry breaker.

>>318590
[S2]
Okay, cool. So like you don't have a strong opinion either way in a moral context, but in a legal context, you think you should be allowed to murder the person who's hooked up to you, assuming you were forced into that position?

[S1]
Yeah, so in the moral context, so I'd have to think about it more. But in the moral context, if I imagine myself waking up, I can imagine myself waking up and I'm hooked up to you. And the question is, do I, you know, do I kill you?

Do I kill you? And would it be wrong rather? Would it be wrong if I were to kill you if someone else made you dependent on me?

I would probably have to think more about that. Regardless of what my view is morally, I think the case for legality is a clear symmetry breaker. Morally, it's still like part of me still, it would seem to be wrong for me to do that morally.

So I'd have to think about that more clearly. But I could take the view that either way though, I could understand if someone were to bring the argument that it would still be a symmetry breaker morally. Someone can say, okay, well, it's not morally wrong in the case of rape because you're not the person who forced this other being to be dependent on you in the first place.

Like I would accept that. I would understand that. There's no inconsistency.

[S2]
Right.

[S1]
Morally or legally.

[S2]
Okay.

[S1]
Like I would totally understand that argument. So I think there's a clear case to be made that in the rape case versus the non-rape case, there is not a contradiction if you understand the symmetry breakers that can be put forth. This is actually the most common objection to Judith Germaine Thompson's argument is the responsibility objection.

She has some responses to it. She doesn't have responses to my version of the responsibility objection because I've seen hers and modified mine accordingly to capture what we care about. Yeah.

So do you still think that there is an inconsistency on my view?

[S2]
Somewhat. Okay. So fundamentally speaking, the reason you have an issue with abortion, whether there's a responsibility aspect there or not, it's because you're taking away a sentient life that has a will to live potentially that could experience well-being that wants to live, right?

[S1]
Well, that would be a pro-toto reason to not do it, but it's not a pro-toto reason necessarily. There are many cases where we think it's okay to take away the life of a sentient being that has a will to live or a potential will to live. There are many contexts where we find this moral.

It all depends on what context you're talking about. For example, there are contexts or self-defense. Even if they have a will to live, I don't care, I'll shoot him.

If there's a justified war, I don't care, I'll shoot him. If there's… There are many different areas where I would say, even if it is the case that there is another individual that has the will to live and is sentient, I would be okay with killing them.

Just depends on the context. All I'm saying here is this is one of the contexts where you can make a reasonable argument to that it is okay to kill them.

[S2]
Right. Okay. Goddamn cat.

I'm just reading over the… Yeah, and thinking. So what about issues in situations where let's say you had to make a decision under duress?

What do you mean? So let's say, I don't know, in a relationship, you agreed to have a pregnancy with your spouse, but it was under duress. Like the person threatened you with something in some sort of way, like maybe physically or threatened to cut you off, put you on the street, something like that.

[S1]
Yeah, so in other words, like if you don't get pregnant with my baby, I'm just gonna beat the shit out of you or something like that, right? Is that what you're asking?

[S2]
Well, it could even be like less kind of graphic. Like let's say, okay, this person that you're with has no family, no skills, can't really get a job. And if like, okay, if you don't get pregnant, they'll kick you out on the street and you'll be homeless, like a situation like that.

[S1]
Yeah, so I'll point out one important thing. I'll try my best to answer that. So the first thing I'll point out is that even if I can't answer that, it doesn't mean that it would be an inconsistency on my view in the situation where the individual really full-on partook in the forcing of another being in a state of dependency on you.

I think your examples that you're giving are where we kind of scale that symmetry breaker down. Well, let's say it's because there could be a spectrum of how much you actually partook in forcing this other being to be dependent on you. You could have full-on forced it to be dependent on you.

You could have been full-on not forced it to be dependent on you in the case of full-on rape. And there could be middle gray grounds, middle gray areas where, okay, you weren't like raped at the point of a gun or something, but you required shelter, it would have drastically made a big difference in your life if you didn't do this, all of these things that kind of lead us to some sort of middle ground. There's like a gray area.

And to be honest, I haven't thought fully about it. I don't have a full thought out view in these gray areas. It's kind of like a sororities paradox where where does a puddle become a lake?

I don't have the exact answer to how many drops of water it takes for a puddle to become a lake. I don't also don't think I need to, it's okay. There's a gray area and there's ambiguity.

But it's clear that in the majority of cases of abortions, we're not talking about that. We are talking about non-rape cases. And I can still, even if it wasn't, it would still wouldn't be an inconsistency for me to have a problem in the cases where there is full-on voluntary non-abortive status.

Because the symmetry breaker, particularly enforcing another being to be in a state of dependence on you is full-on and there.

>>318591
[S2]
Okay. Let's see. You know what?

The only thing I can really think of right now that I'm gonna go with is, I don't really give a fuck about a four, five month old fetus. Okay. So, like we're, okay.

So, like, even if we concede that like a four or five month old fetus is sentient, I don't know if you wanted to go over some of the research on that.

[S1]
Yeah, we can. But I'd let you, I want you to finish your point.

[S2]
Yeah, sure. Yeah, even if they're like, let's just say sentience occurs at any time. I don't give a fucking shit.

It's just such a small insignificant being that is living rent-free in my body and through, I don't know, just normal sort of daily activities that, you know, people enjoy and do. That being was created. It's like comparing like consensual sex to, I don't know, you poisoning someone.

I don't know. I find it kind of, so that they develop dependency to you.

[S1]
I do see a distinction between that.

[S2]
I know it's just to analogize, like I know what you mean, but big difference there. Like I do see a big distinction between you just partaking in, I don't know, normal casual sex with people. It's just an activity that a lot of people do daily just for fun and enjoyment and to build a relationship.

Okay, just out of, you know, a baby happens.

[S1]
Well, before we go there, you can disagree with the symmetry breaker, and we can go into why I think it would be absurd to disagree with the symmetry breaker, but before we go there, I just want concession that my position is not inconsistent.

[S2]
Yeah, it's not inconsistent. No, I agree it's not inconsistent.

[S1]
All right, so we agree that my position is not inconsistent. Okay, great. Now we can go into why the value of the fetus at its current sentience level, I don't think that just saying, well, I just don't care about that, I think that leads to reductio.

We could go into that. Okay, sure.

[S2]
It's sort of a two-parter. So like for one, you know, you're engaging in an activity that like everybody fucking does just for enjoyment or to be close to their partner. We just have a biological direction.

[S1]
I'm just writing down the symmetry breakers, engaging in activity.

[S2]
Yeah, like a normal casual activity that, you know, most people enjoy.

[S1]
Okay, if injecting someone was a poison, it was in a culture, was engaging in activity everyone enjoyed.

[S2]
Well, right. I mean, I see a difference between injecting somebody with poisons, they're dependent on you. Playing with stem cells, Richard.

Okay, sure.

[S1]
Playing around with stem cells. And if you play, you knew that if you play with stem cells, these were special stem cells such that it would just form a being and the being would be dependent, be forced to be dependent on you. And it would have the, something would happen where it would hook itself up to you and you would have forced this being to be in a dependent state on you.

And the being is sentient, you knew the risk. You know, you don't have to, we don't have to poison the well with poison. It could be any action where you take another being and you force the being to be dependent on you.

[S2]
Okay, sure. And secondly, I mean, just the level of sentience. I think one of the papers that, I don't know if I sent you anything, but one of the papers that I relied on in a previous debate for fetal sentience, it talked about things like lack of electrical activity in the brain.

There's like lung punctuations of inactivity. Just, we can go over that. Yeah, you're a doctor.

So yeah, I mean, the level of sentience as well also factors into this. I just don't see it as a huge moral issue for me to not inconvenience myself and burden myself with some stupid kid who's going to ruin my life or be a burden to the world in some way or live and suffer and shit like that, you know?

[S1]
Okay, two points. First thing, question. Do you only care about the current level of sentience that, in terms of ascribing value to a given being, do you only consider the current level of sentience of the given being?

Or do you consider the potential for sentience for beings that have reached the given point of sentience or reached sentience at some given point? Because there's a very different, they form to very different conclusions.

[S2]
So when you say, well, the level of sentience- So if I only care about current sentience or if something can be extremely sentient in the future- Well, no, just the first part for now.

[S1]
Just do you only, is the only thing that you're caring about is the current level of sentience when ascribing your value, whether they have the value to, like in this context, not be chopped up into pieces.

[S2]
Okay, yeah. Like if it's something that in some way is violating my bodily autonomy, like a being living inside me, then yeah, in that situation.

[S1]
Well, I actually don't think that it's violating your bodily autonomy. I think you're the one in this case that violates it.

[S2]
No, it absolutely is.

[S1]
Wait, wait, hold on. Wait, wait, wait. So let me understand this.

So let's say you played with some stem cells and if you played with some stem cells, you knew like something would happen and I would be in a state of dependence on you and it would instantiate the state of dependence, right? And you engaged in playing with the stem cells and lo and behold, it reached out its tendrils and forced me to be in such a weakened state that I was dependent on just you and it hooked itself up to us. Who has violated one's bodily autonomy when you perform this action?

Did you violate my bodily autonomy or am I violating your bodily autonomy? I think a much stronger case would be made that you are violating my bodily autonomy, not the other way around.

[S2]
Okay, sure. I'll concede that. Okay, cool.

[S1]
So you are violating the bodily autonomy of the fetus, not the other way around.

[S2]
Okay, okay, I won't use that wording. I'd agree with that. I would say, yeah, I would say it's inhibiting you in some way.

It's inconveniencing you in some way, but it's not violating your bodily autonomy. Okay.

[S1]
Now the question is, do you, are you only considering in your evaluation in this context, are you only considering the current level of sentence?

[S2]
Yeah, yeah, in that context, yeah.

[S1]
Okay, now if that's the case, if that's, so you see no difference between in a context, in that context, you would see no difference between a grandpa who is in a coma, but well, not even a grandpa, a baby who is in a coma, a full fledged baby who's in a coma, but will wake up and a full fledged baby who's in a coma, but will not wake up.

[S2]
You wouldn't see a difference there. Okay, well, the difference there is not inside you.

[S1]
No, no, no, no, no. Let's say it was. You don't see a difference between a full fledged baby that.

[S2]
Oh, okay. Yeah, if the only reason, if the only way to get rid of it is to kill it, then yeah.

[S1]
Okay, wait a minute.

[S2]
I don't care.

[S1]
Hold on one moment. So in a normal context, so in just in any normal context, you would, you would, is it also the case that you would just consider the potential for sentience? I mean, sorry, the current level of sentience and not the potential for sentience.

[S2]
In a normal context?

>>318592
[S1]
Yeah, in any other context, aside from being inside the body. In any other.

[S2]
Well, yeah, I mean, like if somebody has some sort of really bad head injury and they're in a coma and they're like level of sentience is lower than if they were, they didn't have the brain injury, but they're going to heal from that and be conscious.

[S1]
They did in both cases. So in both cases, they have the brain injury and they both have a very low level of sentience, but one individual will recover when the other individual won't. One individual will have or will have a very high probability of developing future sentience in the future.

The other individual won't. Do they have the same value to you?

[S2]
No, like we're talking about like just a normal person, right? OK, well, yeah, then the person who's going to have future sentience is going to have more value.

[S1]
Yeah, yeah, yeah. OK, so and so do you in this context where it's inside the body, it is also the case that there's a very high probability that this individual is not just going to remain at this level of sentience. They're going to also have.

Yeah. So do you only consider the current level of sentience if it's inside the body or?

[S2]
Yeah, I'd only consider the current level. There's like I do have reasons.

[S1]
Wait, hold on. Let me let me just let me just ask you this question. So let's say there was this woman, right?

And this woman just decided for fun that she would take a being who is in a coma and just shove it in her womb, right? And if she did that in some hypothetical world in such a way that there would be an instantiation of dependency and then things would be hooked up and she would and it would be hooked up for nine months. So now so now.

Is your valuation the same as if the being did not would not have any future degree of sentience? It's it's just the same valuation as if there was no potential for future sentience, even if there was.

[S2]
OK, and the coma patient that was put inside the womb. Was this person normal before?

[S1]
Oh, no, no. Yeah, they were. They were like like they.

[S2]
They were just always in a coma. And well, they could be always.

[S1]
Yeah, they could be always. Sure.

[S2]
Yeah, if they were always. Yeah, if they were like always in a coma where they had a similar level of sentience as a fetus, then I'd say so much more now.

[S1]
So OK, so the next question. So you're just dying the current levels. OK, now the question is in terms of what level, because we don't actually know the level of sentience of the fetus.

So that's, I guess, where this would go. So I would just ask you what level of sentience are you comfortable with, even if it is the case that you force this being in a state of dependency on you, even if it's the case that you violated its bodily autonomy, not the other way around, even if it's the case that you knew about this when you did it, what level of sentience are you OK with chopping it up after?

[S2]
OK, so I like I have a very hard time believing that like two, three, four month old fetus somewhere around there. Very hard time believing that it has like any actual desire to live.

[S1]
Like desire for live is not the same thing as sentience.

[S2]
Well, I. Well, wouldn't you have to have sentience?

[S1]
Like I know it's it's not.

[S2]
Well, it's it's it's linked to like level of sentience.

[S1]
So a desire for if you have a desire for sentience, it doesn't tell that you are sentient. But if you do not have a desire for sentience, it does not entail that you are not sentient. You can have a higher.

[S2]
Sure, I mean, you could. Yeah, you could want to kill yourself. Sure, well, you can.

[S1]
There can be two beings. One being has a higher level of sentience with no desires to to to do anything, any of these activities or whatnot. And it could have a higher level of sentience than being that does have desires to do activities.

[S2]
So OK, OK, I understand what you're saying. I understand what you're saying. Well, my armpits are really sweaty.

I just worked out. I'm not nervous. So, yeah, so.

All right. I understand what you're saying. It might not.

OK, so it would kind of relate to sentience a little bit. But I'd say desire for sentience is a separate aspect to it. I have a very hard time believing that and like a fetus early on in the pregnancy, two, three, four months would have any desire to be sentient.

And like I mean, just obviously it's a level of sentience.

[S1]
It's not about it's it's not.

[S2]
Well, it is partly about saying it is partly about sentience. I mean, it's it's ability to like feel experience isn't going to be the same as, you know, you or me. But on top of that, I really have a hard time believing that a two, three, four month old fetus is going to have desire for sentience hopes.


[S2]
I understand that's separate from sentience. I understand that's separate from sentience. So that's also a part of it.

[S1]
So someone took Brie, right? If someone took Brie, if a woman, you know, Brie, Oh, you, the, this is the mentally handicapped individual that the, that was commonly cited as, Oh, I'm okay. So let's, so let's say there is a mentally handicapped individual, right?

Um, we can, uh, if you're not familiar with the Brie beta, that's fine. Um, so let's say an individual, we take this mentally handicapped individual who will tomorrow become non-mentally handicapped naturally, and a woman decides to take her and take this being and shove it in her vagina and shove it up her vagina in her womb. And there's an instantiation where there is a nine month dependency and everything is hooked up by doing that.

It is what you would say that it would be permissible to, to kill that being after, so to kill the mentally handicapped. Okay. Now let's say there is a giant woman, right.

Who goes to the mentally handicapped school and takes every, all the mentally handicapped children and shoves it in her womb, shoves every one of them in their womb.

[S2]
Sure.

Full debate showing ABORTION IS MURDER HERE https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=zkH3vrevU9o

it is a necessary evil
But of course, nobody has abortions for fun, and if someone does, I suppose it's for the best for everyone.

>>318594
>>318593
>>318592
>>318590
>>318591
>>318595

meds. Now.